A note on cartel stability and endogenous sequencing with tacit collusion

DOI10.1007/S00712-008-0053-8zbMATH Open1176.91081OpenAlexW2096246909MaRDI QIDQ1039901FDOQ1039901

Authors: Marc Escrihuela-Villar 

Publication date: 23 November 2009

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-008-0053-8

Recommendations

• Sequential moves and tacit collusion: Reaction-function cycles in a finite pricing duopoly
• Tacit collusion in differentiated Cournot games
• Tacit collusion and market concentration under network effects
• Stable cartels revisited
• The endogenous formation of cartels
• Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions
• Tacit collusion in a spatial model with delivered pricing
• Cartel size and collusive stability with non-capitalistic players
• Collusion in Multiproduct Oligopoly Games under a Finite Horizon

zbMATH Keywords

collusionStackelberg leadershipcartel stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Trade models (91B60)

Cites Work

• A simple model of imperfect competition where 4 are few and 6 are many
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• Stable Cartels
• Stable cartels revisited
• Endogenous sequencing of firm decisions
• Which acceptable agreements are equilibria?
• When imperfect collution is profitable

Cited In (6)

• Price or quantity in tacit collusion?
• Stable cartels revisited
• Endogenous availability, cartels, and merger in an equilibrium price dispersion
• A dynamic approach to cartel formation
• Imperfect collusion in monitored markets with free entry
• Cartel size and collusive stability with non-capitalistic players

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