A note on cartel stability and endogenous sequencing with tacit collusion

DOI10.1007/S00712-008-0053-8MaRDI QIDQ1039901zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Marc Escrihuela-Villar

Publication date 23 November 2009

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-008-0053-8

zbMATH Keywords

collusionStackelberg leadershipcartel stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Trade models (91B60)

Recommendations

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• Collusion in Multiproduct Oligopoly Games under a Finite Horizon

Cites work

• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• A simple model of imperfect competition where 4 are few and 6 are many
• Endogenous sequencing of firm decisions
• Stable Cartels
• Stable cartels revisited
• When imperfect collution is profitable
• Which acceptable agreements are equilibria?

Cited in

(6)

• A dynamic approach to cartel formation
• Price or quantity in tacit collusion?
• Cartel size and collusive stability with non-capitalistic players
• Imperfect collusion in monitored markets with free entry
• Stable cartels revisited
• Endogenous availability, cartels, and merger in an equilibrium price dispersion

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