Sequential moves and tacit collusion: Reaction-function cycles in a finite pricing duopoly

DOI10.1006/JETH.1998.2484MaRDI QIDQ1289264zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Klaus Wallner

Publication date 27 May 1999

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/0b40e5bc52fdd93e05ff5f434a51fda0f02f44fa

zbMATH Keywords

Markov strategiesdynamic price-competition gamesfinite horizon, sequential move pricing duopoly

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Economic growth models (91B62)

Recommendations

• A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles
• Dynamic Duopoly: Prices and Quantities
• Revisiting dynamic duopoly with consumer switching costs
• A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs
• Dynamic complexity in duopoly games

Cites work

• A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles

Cited in

(4)

• Asynchronous choice and Markov equilibria
• Coordination need not be a problem
• A note on cartel stability and endogenous sequencing with tacit collusion
• A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles

This page was built for publication: Sequential moves and tacit collusion: Reaction-function cycles in a finite pricing duopoly

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1289264)