Asynchronous choice and Markov equilibria
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Publication:1601451
DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2809zbMath1010.91011OpenAlexW2047968224MaRDI QIDQ1601451
Publication date: 26 June 2002
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/3aee129a5db7f510186b2e4e1e99cf36fc5533a9
Related Items (7)
Bounded memory folk theorem ⋮ Markov perfect equilibria in repeated asynchronous choice games ⋮ The emergence of cooperation through leadership ⋮ Structure-preserving desynchronization of minority games ⋮ Repeated games with one-memory ⋮ Protocol invariance and the timing of decisions in dynamic games ⋮ Asynchronous games with transfers: uniqueness and optimality
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