Bounded memory folk theorem
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Cites work
- An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs
- Asynchronous choice and Markov equilibria
- Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games
- Bounded rationality, neural network and folk theorem in repeated games with discounting
- Cooperation and bounded recall
- Cooperation and Effective Computability
- Finite memory and imperfect monitoring
- Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games
- Finitely many players with bounded recall in infinitely repeated games
- Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring
- How Robust Is the Folk Theorem?*
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3777289 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1246230 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099351 (Why is no real title available?)
- Limited records and reputation bubbles
- On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
- On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
- Repeated games with \(M\)-period bounded memory (pure strategies)
- Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
- Repeated games with one-memory
- Repeated games with stationary bounded recall strategies
- Strategic entropy and complexity in repeated games
- The folk theorem for finitely repeated games with mixed strategies
- The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
Cited in
(14)- Repeated games with one-memory
- Repeated games with \(M\)-period bounded memory (pure strategies)
- Bounded memory and incomplete information
- Learning efficient equilibria in repeated games
- The diffusion-driven instability and complexity for a single-handed discrete Fisher equation
- Community enforcement using modal actions
- Bounded memory protocols
- Approachability with bounded memory
- Limits of correlation in repeated games with bounded memory
- Memory-two strategies forming symmetric mutual reinforcement learning equilibrium in repeated prisoners' dilemma game
- Limited records and reputation bubbles
- A Minority Game with Bounded Recall
- Algorithmic collusion and a Folk theorem from learning with bounded rationality
- A ``super folk theorem for dynastic repeated games
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