An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs
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Publication:768237
DOI10.2140/pjm.1956.6.1zbMath0074.34403OpenAlexW1982813377MaRDI QIDQ768237
Publication date: 1956
Published in: Pacific Journal of Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2140/pjm.1956.6.1
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