The folk theorem for finitely repeated games with mixed strategies
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Publication:1893197
DOI10.1007/BF01258206zbMath0835.90144MaRDI QIDQ1893197
Publication date: 15 April 1996
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (19)
Bounded memory folk theorem ⋮ How fast do equilibrium payoff sets converge in repeated games? ⋮ Construction of subgame-perfect mixed-strategy equilibria in repeated games ⋮ The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Time-Dependent Discounting ⋮ Finitely repeated games with monitoring options ⋮ On the feasible payoff set of two-player repeated games with unequal discounting ⋮ Verifiable crowd computing: coping with bounded rationality ⋮ Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals ⋮ Perfect folk theorems. Does public randomization matter? ⋮ Repeated Games with Complete Information ⋮ General properties of long-run supergames ⋮ Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring ⋮ A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games ⋮ Negotiation games with unobservable mixed disagreement actions ⋮ Finitely repeated games: a generalized Nash folk theorem ⋮ Myopic perception in repeated games ⋮ Perturbed finitely repeated games ⋮ A folk theorem for stochastic games with finite horizon ⋮ Folk theorems in multicriteria repeated \(N\)-person games.
Cites Work
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- An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs
- Folk theorems in overlapping generations games
- On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
- Finitely Repeated Games
- Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- Overlapping Generation Games with Mixed Strategies
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