A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games

DOI10.1007/s00182-020-00735-zzbMath1461.91037OpenAlexW2938561202MaRDI QIDQ2021816

Ghislain-Herman Demeze-Jouatsa

Publication date: 27 April 2021

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00735-z

zbMATH Keywords

pure strategyfinitely repeated gamessubgame perfect Nash equilibriumlimit perfect folk theoremobservable mixed strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

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• When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?
• Nash equilibria of finitely repeated games
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• On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
• Finitely Repeated Games
• The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition
• The "Folk Theorem" for Repeated Games with Complete Information
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Perfect Finite Horizon Folk Theorem
• Renegotiation in Finitely Repeated Games

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