Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Perfect Finite Horizon Folk Theorem
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Publication:4836509
DOI10.2307/2951632zbMath0834.90146MaRDI QIDQ4836509
Publication date: 1 April 1996
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/63950
subgame perfect equilibrium; perfect folk theorem; \(n\)-player normal form game; \(T\)-fold repeated game; recursively distinct Nash payoffs
91A20: Multistage and repeated games
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