Existence of nontrivial equilibria in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring.
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Publication:1864818
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00008-8zbMath1092.91506MaRDI QIDQ1864818
Publication date: 23 March 2003
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
91A20: Multistage and repeated games
Related Items
Efficiency results in \(N\) player games with imperfect private monitoring, Introduction to repeated games with private monitoring, Bounding payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring: \(n\)-player games
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