Commitment and observability in games

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Publication:1804635

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80001-6zbMath0821.90148MaRDI QIDQ1804635

Kyle Bagwell

Publication date: 15 May 1995

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)




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