Commitment and observability in games
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Publication:1804635
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80001-6zbMath0821.90148MaRDI QIDQ1804635
Publication date: 15 May 1995
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
- On the robustness of equilibrium refinements
- Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Equilibrium Limit Pricing: The Effects of Private Information and Stochastic Demand
- Sequential Equilibria
- Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
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