Strategic advance sales, demand uncertainty and overcommitment
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Publication:2308797
DOI10.1007/S00199-019-01184-WzbMath1435.91099OpenAlexW2797975009WikidataQ128145465 ScholiaQ128145465MaRDI QIDQ2308797
Sébastien Mitraille, Henry Thille
Publication date: 3 April 2020
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.uoguelph.ca/economics/repec/workingpapers/2017/2017-08.pdf
Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Cites Work
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