Games with imperfectly observable commitment

DOI10.1006/game.1997.0524zbMath0899.90168OpenAlexW3087638670MaRDI QIDQ1378028

Sjaak Hurkens, Eric E. C. van Damme

Publication date: 5 February 1998

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/49d474ea6078cf0d325e3dc22a797edbd94a29fe

zbMATH Keywords

first-mover advantagepure strategy equilibriamodels of commitmentnoisy Stackelberg equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) 2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (28)

DOES NOISE UNDERMINE THE FIRST-MOVER ADVANTAGE? AN EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS OF BAGWELL'S EXAMPLE ⋮ STRATEGIC DELEGATION IN A STACKELBERG GAME WITH MULTIPLE STAGES ⋮ Games with espionage ⋮ A NOTE ON BAGWELL'S PARADOX AND FORWARD INDUCTION IN THREE CLASSIC GAMES ⋮ Commitment and observability in a contracting environment ⋮ Noisy leadership: An experimental approach ⋮ Cournot and Stackelberg equilibrium under strategic delegation: an equivalence result ⋮ Reputation with noisy precommitment ⋮ Retailers' endogenous sequencing game and information acquisition game in the presence of information leakage ⋮ Robust solutions to Stackelberg games: addressing bounded rationality and limited observations in human cognition ⋮ A survey on bilevel optimization under uncertainty ⋮ Feigning ignorance for long-term gains ⋮ Noisy signaling: theory and experiment ⋮ The value of commitment in contests and tournaments when observation is costly ⋮ Trembling hand perfection for mixed quantal/best response equilibria ⋮ The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs ⋮ An experimental study of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs ⋮ From ultimatum to Nash bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence ⋮ Imperfectly observable commitments in \(n\)-player games ⋮ Strategic advance sales, demand uncertainty and overcommitment ⋮ Perfect versus imperfect observability -- an experimental test of Bagwell's result ⋮ Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs ⋮ Spying in Bertrand markets under incomplete information: who benefits and is it stable? ⋮ Introduction to repeated games with private monitoring ⋮ Moral hazard and private monitoring ⋮ On sustaining cooperation without public observations ⋮ On failing to cooperate when monitoring is private ⋮ Costly Leader Games with a Probabilistically Non-Strategic Leader

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Persistent equilibria in strategic games
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• The tracing procedure: A Bayesian approach to defining a solution for n- person noncooperative games
• Commitment and observability in games
• A new theory of equilibrium selection for games with complete information
• Learning by forgetful players
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

This page was built for publication: Games with imperfectly observable commitment