Games with imperfectly observable commitment

DOI10.1006/GAME.1997.0524MaRDI QIDQ1378028zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sjaak Hurkens, Eric van Damme

Publication date 5 February 1998

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/49d474ea6078cf0d325e3dc22a797edbd94a29fe

zbMATH Keywords

first-mover advantagepure strategy equilibriamodels of commitmentnoisy Stackelberg equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)

Recommendations

• Commitment and observability in games
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 18247 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47120 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7005721 (Why is no real title available?)
• A new theory of equilibrium selection for games with complete information
• Commitment and observability in games
• Learning by forgetful players
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Persistent equilibria in strategic games
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
• The tracing procedure: A Bayesian approach to defining a solution for n- person noncooperative games

Cited in

(30)

• Spying in Bertrand markets under incomplete information: who benefits and is it stable?
• Noisy signaling: theory and experiment
• Strategic delegation in a Stackelberg game with multiple stages
• On failing to cooperate when monitoring is private
• Retailers' endogenous sequencing game and information acquisition game in the presence of information leakage
• Games with espionage
• Reputation with noisy precommitment
• Costly leader games with a probabilistically non-strategic leader
• Cournot and Stackelberg equilibrium under strategic delegation: an equivalence result
• Perfect versus imperfect observability -- an experimental test of Bagwell's result
• Unilateral commitments in finitely repeated games
• Feigning ignorance for long-term gains
• A note on Bagwell's paradox and forward induction in three classic games
• Competition on many fronts: A Stackelberg signaling equilibrium
• DOES NOISE UNDERMINE THE FIRST-MOVER ADVANTAGE? AN EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS OF BAGWELL'S EXAMPLE
• From ultimatum to Nash bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence
• A survey on bilevel optimization under uncertainty
• Moral hazard and private monitoring
• On sustaining cooperation without public observations
• Introduction to repeated games with private monitoring
• Strategic advance sales, demand uncertainty and overcommitment
• Imperfectly observable commitments in \(n\)-player games
• Noisy leadership: An experimental approach
• Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs
• An experimental study of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs
• Commitment and observability in a contracting environment
• Trembling hand perfection for mixed quantal/best response equilibria
• The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs
• Robust solutions to Stackelberg games: addressing bounded rationality and limited observations in human cognition
• The value of commitment in contests and tournaments when observation is costly

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