From ultimatum to Nash bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence

DOI10.1007/s10683-006-1468-0zbMath1132.91002OpenAlexW2143635556MaRDI QIDQ2499521

Andreas Stiehler, Sven Fischer, Wieland Müller, Güth, Werner

Publication date: 14 August 2006

Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/files/545243/41.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Nash bargainingExperimentsCommitmentImperfect observabilityUltimatum bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

Noisy leadership: An experimental approach ⋮ Control in mutualisms: combined implications of partner choice and bargaining roles ⋮ Information acquisition in the ultimatum game: an experimental study ⋮ Do people make strategic commitments? Experimental evidence on strategic information avoidance

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

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