Order of play in strategically equivalent games in extensive form
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Publication:1357218
DOI10.1007/BF01262516zbMath0873.90116MaRDI QIDQ1357218
Publication date: 16 June 1997
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (12)
The path to equilibrium in sequential and simultaneous games: a mousetracking study ⋮ Ordering in Games with Reduced Memory and Planning Horizon of Players ⋮ Forward induction and entry deterrence: an experiment ⋮ Timing of messages and the Aumann conjecture: a multiple-selves approach ⋮ Ideal reactive equilibrium ⋮ Does informational equivalence preserve strategic behavior? Experimental results on Trockel's model of Selten's chain store story ⋮ Burning money and (pseudo) first-mover advantages: an experimental study on forward induction ⋮ From ultimatum to Nash bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence ⋮ The relevance of equal splits in ultimatum games ⋮ The canonical extensive form of a game form. II: Representation ⋮ Perfect versus imperfect observability -- an experimental test of Bagwell's result ⋮ Beyond Normal Form Invariance: First Mover Advantage in Two-Stage Games with or without Predictable Cheap Talk
Cites Work
- An evolutionary interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's experimental results on coordination
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- Remarks on the Intrinsic Equations of Twisted Curves
- Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Ordered Hypotheses for Multiple Treatments: A Significance Test for Linear Ranks
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