On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
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Publication:4726082
DOI10.2307/1912320zbMath0616.90103OpenAlexW2130937741MaRDI QIDQ4726082
Elon Kohlberg, Jean-Francois Mertens
Publication date: 1986
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1912320
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