A theory of forward induction in finitely repeated games
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Publication:1891348
DOI10.1007/BF01079499zbMath0827.90142MaRDI QIDQ1891348
Publication date: 30 May 1995
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
91A20: Multistage and repeated games
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