scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4141836

MaRDI QIDQ3474501zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Eric van Damme

Publication date 1987

zbMATH Keywords

Bargainingdisturbed gamesEvolutionarily stable strategiesEvolutionary game theoryextensive form gamefair divisionIncomplete informationNash equilibriumProper equilibriaRegular equilibriaRepeated gamesSequential equilibriaSignalling gamessubgame perfect equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) 2-person games (91A05) Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Problems related to evolution (92D15) Population dynamics (general) (92D25)

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Cited in

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• Discretionary rewards as a feedback mechanism
• Stability and the Nash solution
• Fixed-equilibrium rationalizability in signaling games
• Correlated equilibria and evolutionary stability
• Evolutionary stability in unanimity games with cheap talk
• Limit evolutionarily stable strategies in two-player, normal form games
• Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games
• The graph of Prisoners' Dilemma supergame payoffs as a function of the discount factor
• On self-enforcement in extensive-form games
• Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
• On modifications of the concepts of perfect and proper equilibria
• Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory
• Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants
• Evolution and strategic stability: From Maynard Smith to Kohlberg and Mertens
• Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies
• Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games
• On the evolution of optimizing behavior
• Laws of large numbers for dynamical systems with randomly matched individuals
• Communication, correlation, and symmetry in bargaining
• Renegotiation-proof equilibria in repeated prisoners' dilemma
• An amalgation of games
• Imperfectly observable commitments in n-player games
• On the invariance of solutions of finite games
• Detecting all evolutionarily stable strategies
• On the relation between Nash equilibria and undominated strategies for two person, finite games
• The theory of normal form games from the differentiable viewpoint
• Nash refinements of equilibria
• The regularization of NB-scheme in differential games
• Evolutionarily stable strategies in the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Undominated equilibria in games with strategic complementarities
• Rationality and bounded rationality
• Social learning in recurring games
• Evolutionary stability of pure-strategy equilibria in finite games
• Odd man out: The proposal-making model
• Rationalizable outcomes of large private-value first-price discrete auctions.
• The canonical extensive form of a game form. II: Representation
• Neutrally stable outcomes in cheap-talk coordination games
• Polytope games
• Implementation of the -value
• Inefficient stage Nash is not stable
• Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli
• The consistency principle for games in strategic form
• A concept of equilibrium for a game under uncertainty
• Evolution in games with endogenous mistake probabilities.
• The existence of equilibrium in games with randomly perturbed payoffs and applications to experimental economics
• Individually rational pure strategies in large games
• Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
• Lotka-Volterra equation and replicator dynamics: New issues in classification
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• On the origin of convention: Evidence from symmetric bargaining games
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• Natural selection and social preferences
• Continuity and equilibrium stability
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• Metastability in stochastic replicator dynamics
• Stable analysis of solution set for system of quasivariational relations with applications
• The fair allocation of an indivisible good when monetary compensations are possible
• Subjective reasoning -- solutions
• Stability and trembles in extensive-form games
• Are strictly perfect equilibria proper? A counterexample
• Learning in games via reinforcement and regularization
• GLOBAL STABILITY OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN AGGREGATIVE GAMES
• Inertial game dynamics and applications to constrained optimization
• THE COMPLETE VERSION OF THE GORRITI HAT GAME
• A REFINEMENT CONCEPT FOR EQUILIBRIA IN MULTICRITERIA GAMES VIA STABLE SCALARIZATIONS
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• Evolutionary game theory: a generalization of the ESS definition
• Darwinism in quantum systems?
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• Universalization and altruism
• The dynamic instability of dispersed price equilibria
• A dynamical characterization of evolutionarily stable states
• Smooth Nash equilibria: algorithms and complexity
• A sequence-form differentiable path-following method to compute Nash equilibria
• Nash's demand game and resource-allocation
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• Approximations and well-posedness in multicriteria games
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