Learning in nonatomic games. I: Finite action spaces and population games

From MaRDI portal
Publication:2106066

DOI10.3934/JDG.2022018zbMATH Open1503.91014arXiv2107.01595OpenAlexW3178113021MaRDI QIDQ2106066FDOQ2106066


Authors: Saeed Hadikhanloo, Rida Laraki, Panayotis Mertikopoulos, Sylvain Sorin Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 8 December 2022

Published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: We examine the long-run behavior of a wide range of dynamics for learning in nonatomic games, in both discrete and continuous time. The class of dynamics under consideration includes fictitious play and its regularized variants, the best-reply dynamics (again, possibly regularized), as well as the dynamics of dual averaging / "follow the regularized leader" (which themselves include as special cases the replicator dynamics and Friedman's projection dynamics). Our analysis concerns both the actual trajectory of play and its time-average, and we cover potential and monotone games, as well as games with an evolutionarily stable state (global or otherwise). We focus exclusively on games with finite action spaces; nonatomic games with continuous action spaces are treated in detail in Part II of this paper.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2107.01595




Recommendations




Cites Work


Cited In (17)





This page was built for publication: Learning in nonatomic games. I: Finite action spaces and population games

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2106066)