Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
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Publication:1896663
DOI10.1006/game.1995.1023zbMath0832.90126OpenAlexW2264897026WikidataQ55980319 ScholiaQ55980319MaRDI QIDQ1896663
Richard D. McKelvey, Thomas R. Palfrey
Publication date: 5 March 1996
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4510.pdf
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