Modeling bluffing behavior in signaling security games

DOI10.1111/ITOR.12812MaRDI QIDQ6071098zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors

Publication date 27 November 2023

Published in International Transactions in Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/itor.12812

zbMATH Keywords

bluffing security gamefake resourcesperfect Bayesian equilibriumsignaling game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research, mathematical programming (90-XX)

Recommendations

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• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria

Cites work

• A study of general and security Stackelberg game formulations
• Cooperative advertising to induce strategic customers for purchase at the full price
• Critical infrastructure protection using secrecy -- a discrete simultaneous game
• Deception-based game theoretical approach to mitigate DoS attacks
• Modeling secrecy and deception in a multiple-period attacker-defender signaling game
• On generalized Stackelberg strategies
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• Risk averse Stackelberg security games with quantal response
• Security and Game Theory
• The r‐interdiction selective multi‐depot vehicle routing problem

Cited in

(1)

• Toward a formal analysis of deceptive signaling

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