Modeling bluffing behavior in signaling security games
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Publication:6071098
DOI10.1111/itor.12812OpenAlexW3031371892MaRDI QIDQ6071098
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Publication date: 27 November 2023
Published in: International Transactions in Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/itor.12812
Cites Work
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