Modeling bluffing behavior in signaling security games

DOI10.1111/itor.12812OpenAlexW3031371892MaRDI QIDQ6071098

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Publication date: 27 November 2023

Published in: International Transactions in Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/itor.12812

zbMATH Keywords

perfect Bayesian equilibriumsignaling gamebluffing security gamefake resources

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research, mathematical programming (90-XX)

Cites Work

• Critical infrastructure protection using secrecy -- a discrete simultaneous game
• Modeling secrecy and deception in a multiple-period attacker-defender signaling game
• On generalized Stackelberg strategies
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• A study of general and security Stackelberg game formulations
• Deception-Based Game Theoretical Approach to Mitigate DoS Attacks
• Risk Averse Stackelberg Security Games with Quantal Response
• Security and Game Theory
• The r‐interdiction selective multi‐depot vehicle routing problem
• Cooperative advertising to induce strategic customers for purchase at the full price

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