Modeling secrecy and deception in a multiple-period attacker-defender signaling game
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Publication:1046116
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2009.07.028zbMath1177.91053MaRDI QIDQ1046116
Jun Zhuang, Oguzhan Alagoz, Vicki M. Bier
Publication date: 21 December 2009
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2009.07.028
game theory; dynamic programming; signaling game; multi-period game; secrecy and deception; truthful disclosure
91A80: Applications of game theory
90C39: Dynamic programming
91A28: Signaling and communication in game theory
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