Strategic defense and attack for series and parallel reliability systems

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2007.02.013zbMath1138.91367OpenAlexW1968274760MaRDI QIDQ2462176

Kjell Hausken

Publication date: 23 November 2007

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2007.02.013

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryreliability theoryutility theoryconflictprotectionattackdefensecontest success functionOR in militaryterrorismparallel systemseries systemwar

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Reliability, availability, maintenance, inspection in operations research (90B25) Utility theory (91B16)

Related Items (21)

GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF TWO-PERIOD-DEPENDENT DEGRADED MULTISTATE RELIABILITY SYSTEMS ⋮ Individual versus overarching protection and attack of assets ⋮ Defense against an opportunistic challenger: theory and experiments ⋮ Optimal resource distribution between protection and redundancy considering the time and uncertainties of attacks ⋮ An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games ⋮ False targets efficiency in defense strategy ⋮ Systems under attack-survivability rather than reliability: concept, results, and applications ⋮ Defense and attack for interdependent systems ⋮ An approximate solution to rent-seeking contests with private information ⋮ Defense and attack of performance-sharing common bus systems ⋮ Adversarial issues in reliability ⋮ Revenge or continued attack and defense in defender-attacker conflicts ⋮ Service reliability modeling of distributed computing systems with virus epidemics ⋮ Information Security Investment When Hackers Disseminate Knowledge ⋮ Modeling Public–Private Partnerships in Disaster Management via Centralized and Decentralized Models ⋮ Protecting complex infrastructures against multiple strategic attackers ⋮ COMBINED SERIES AND PARALLEL SYSTEMS SUBJECT TO INDIVIDUAL VERSUS OVERARCHING DEFENSE AND ATTACK ⋮ Skills, Efficiency, and Timing in a Simple Attack and Defense Model ⋮ Separation in homogeneous systems with independent identical elements ⋮ Modeling secrecy and deception in a multiple-period attacker-defender signaling game ⋮ Hybrid defensive resource allocations in the face of partially strategic attackers in a sequential defender-attacker game

Cites Work

• Optimal resource allocation for security in reliability systems
• Interdependent security
• Optimal allocation of multi-state elements in linear consecutively connected systems with vulnerable nodes.
• Contest success functions

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