Hybrid defensive resource allocations in the face of partially strategic attackers in a sequential defender-attacker game

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Publication:257269

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2013.01.029zbMath1332.91029OpenAlexW2060166283MaRDI QIDQ257269

Xiaojun Shan, Jun Zhuang

Publication date: 15 March 2016

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2013.01.029




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