How to preempt attacks in multi-front conflict with limited resources

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2022.05.050OpenAlexW4286646207MaRDI QIDQ2083980

Florian Morath, Kai A. Konrad

Publication date: 17 October 2022

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2022.05.050

zbMATH Keywords

all-pay contestOR in defenseattack and defenseblotto budgetmulti-battle conflict

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research and management science (90Bxx)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• The Colonel Blotto game
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• All-Pay Contests
• How do you defend a network?
• Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry
• The Theory of Play and Integral Equations with Skew Symmetric Kernels

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