The all-pay auction with complete information
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Publication:1814955
DOI10.1007/s001990050092zbMath0859.90058OpenAlexW4301425965MaRDI QIDQ1814955
Dan Kovenock, Casper G. de Vries, Michael R. Baye
Publication date: 1996
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1130&context=economics_articles
Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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