Competition in costly talk

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105740arXiv2103.05317OpenAlexW4386898731MaRDI QIDQ6090464FDOQ6090464

Authors: Federico Vaccari 

Publication date: 17 November 2023

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: This paper studies a communication game between an uninformed decision maker and two perfectly informed senders with conflicting interests. Senders can misreport information at a cost that increases with the size of the misrepresentation. The main results show that equilibria where the decision maker obtains the complete-information payoff hinge on beliefs with undesirable properties. The imposition of a minimal and sensible belief structure is sufficient to generate a robust and essentially unique equilibrium with partial information transmission. A complete characterization of this equilibrium unveils the language senders use to communicate.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2103.05317

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zbMATH Keywords

communicationcompetitionmultiple senderssignalinglyingcostly talk

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

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Cited In (2)

• Toxic types and infectious communication breakdown
• Discussion: Making Progress in a Crowded Market

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