Competition in costly talk

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105740MaRDI QIDQ6090464zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Federico Vaccari

Publication date 17 November 2023

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2103.05317

zbMATH Keywords

communicationcompetitionmultiple senderssignalinglyingcostly talk

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Abstract: This paper studies a communication game between an uninformed decision maker and two perfectly informed senders with conflicting interests. Senders can misreport information at a cost that increases with the size of the misrepresentation. The main results show that equilibria where the decision maker obtains the complete-information payoff hinge on beliefs with undesirable properties. The imposition of a minimal and sensible belief structure is sufficient to generate a robust and essentially unique equilibrium with partial information transmission. A complete characterization of this equilibrium unveils the language senders use to communicate.

Recommendations

• Competition in persuasion
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Cites work

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Cited in

(2)

• Toxic types and infectious communication breakdown
• Discussion: Making Progress in a Crowded Market

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