Competitive cheap talk

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.01.010zbMATH Open1347.91068OpenAlexW2189452743MaRDI QIDQ263377FDOQ263377

Heikki Rantakari, Huanxing Yang, Zhuozheng Li

Publication date: 5 April 2016

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.010

Recommendations

• Multi-period competitive cheap talk with highly biased experts
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zbMATH Keywords

competitioncheap talkmultiple senders

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Interested experts and policy advice: Multiple referrals under open rule
• Eliciting information from multiple experts
• Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
• Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information
• A model of expertise
• Advice from Multiple Experts: A Comparison of Simultaneous, Sequential, and Hierarchical Communication
• Governing Adaptation¹
• Strategic Communication Networks
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Strategic information transmission networks
• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
• The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
• Comparative cheap talk

Cited In (15)

• Probabilistic cheap talk
• Using cheap talk to polarize or unify a group of decision makers
• Cheap talk with coarse understanding
• The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders
• Pre-communication in a coordination game with incomplete information
• Threshold tests as quality signals: optimal strategies, equilibria, and Price of anarchy
• Independent versus collective expertise
• Cheap talk can matter in bargaining
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Cheap CTL compassion in NuSMV
• Equilibrium selection through forward induction in cheap talk games
• Expert panels with selective investigation
• Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives
• Receiver's sensitivity and strategic information transmission in multi-sender cheap talk
• Multi-period competitive cheap talk with highly biased experts

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