Competitive cheap talk

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.01.010MaRDI QIDQ263377zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Zhuozheng Li, Heikki Rantakari, Huanxing Yang

Publication date 5 April 2016

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.010

zbMATH Keywords

competitioncheap talkmultiple senders

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• Multi-period competitive cheap talk with highly biased experts
• Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives
• Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information
• Hierarchical cheap talk
• Cheap Talk With Endogenous Conflict of Interest

Cites work

• A model of expertise
• Advice from Multiple Experts: A Comparison of Simultaneous, Sequential, and Hierarchical Communication
• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information
• Comparative cheap talk
• Eliciting information from multiple experts
• Governing Adaptation¹
• Interested experts and policy advice: Multiple referrals under open rule
• Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Strategic communication networks
• Strategic information transmission networks
• The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication

Cited in

(19)

• Probabilistic cheap talk
• Using cheap talk to polarize or unify a group of decision makers
• Cheap talk with coarse understanding
• The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders
• Pre-communication in a coordination game with incomplete information
• Competition in costly talk
• Threshold tests as quality signals: optimal strategies, equilibria, and Price of anarchy
• Independent versus collective expertise
• Cheap talk can matter in bargaining
• The multiple-volunteers principle
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3856423 (Why is no real title available?)
• Cheap talk and editorial control
• Cheap CTL compassion in NuSMV
• Equilibrium selection through forward induction in cheap talk games
• An example of conflicts of interest as pandering disincentives
• Expert panels with selective investigation
• Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives
• Receiver's sensitivity and strategic information transmission in multi-sender cheap talk
• Multi-period competitive cheap talk with highly biased experts

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