Pre-communication in a coordination game with incomplete information

DOI10.1007/s00182-018-0637-7zbMath1411.91126OpenAlexW2889245610WikidataQ129332219 ScholiaQ129332219MaRDI QIDQ2424237

Lan Zhang, Zhuozheng Li, Huanxing Yang

Publication date: 24 June 2019

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0637-7

zbMATH Keywords

decentralizationcheap talkcoordination gamecentralization

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• Allocation of Decision-making Authority
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• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case
• Coarse Matching

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