Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information.
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Recommendations
- Communication in games of incomplete information: Two players
- Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information
- Cheap talk in games with incomplete information.
- Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
- Unmediated communication with partially verifiable types
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
- A battle-of-the-sexes game with incomplete information
- An Approach to Communication Equilibria
- Cheap Talk and Sequential Equilibria in Signaling Games
- Cheap talk in games with incomplete information.
- Computational Complexity and Communication: Coordination in Two-Player Games
- Correlation without mediation: Expanding the set of equilibrium outcomes by ``cheap pre-play procedures
- Fair Distribution Protocols or How the Players Replace Fortune
- Long Cheap Talk
- Mediated talk
- Multistage Games with Communication
- One-shot public mediated talk
- Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
- Perfect correlated equilibria
- Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
- Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
- Sequential Equilibria
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
- Universal Mechanisms
Cited in
(37)- Unmediated communication with partially verifiable types
- Communication in Cournot oligopoly
- A simple model of secure public communication
- Communication in games of incomplete information: Two players
- Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information
- Long persuasion games
- Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games
- Implementability of correlated and communication equilibrium outcomes in incomplete information games
- Mediated talk: an experiment
- A note on one-shot public mediated talk.
- Computationally restricted unmediated talk under incomplete information
- Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
- Incentives and the structure of communication
- Cheap talk in games with incomplete information.
- Correlated equilibria and communication in games
- Belief-invariant and quantum equilibria in games of incomplete information
- Communication games, sequential equilibrium, and mediators
- Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals
- Pre-communication in a coordination game with incomplete information
- Unmediated and mediated communication equilibria of battle of the sexes with incomplete information
- Secure message transmission on directed networks
- ``Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies: back to the roots
- Interacting mechanisms: a perspective on generalized principal-agent problems
- Cryptography and Game Theory: Designing Protocols for Exchanging Information
- Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
- Perfect implementation
- Deliberative voting
- A detail-free mediator
- How does communication affect beliefs in one-shot games with complete information?
- A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions
- Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited
- Mechanism design and communication networks
- Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
- Communication on networks and strong reliability
- A folk theorem for competing mechanisms
- Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication
- Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol
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