Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information.
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1421900
DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00124-8zbMath1059.91008OpenAlexW3123052421MaRDI QIDQ1421900
Publication date: 3 February 2004
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00124-8
Noncooperative games (91A10) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Games in extensive form (91A18) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
Related Items (28)
A simple model of secure public communication ⋮ Deliberative voting ⋮ Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication ⋮ Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited ⋮ Communication in games of incomplete information: Two players ⋮ Belief-invariant and quantum equilibria in games of incomplete information ⋮ Mechanism design and communication networks ⋮ Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring ⋮ Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals ⋮ Communication in Cournot oligopoly ⋮ Pre-communication in a coordination game with incomplete information ⋮ Perfect implementation ⋮ A detail-free mediator ⋮ Secure message transmission on directed networks ⋮ A folk theorem for competing mechanisms ⋮ Implementability of correlated and communication equilibrium outcomes in incomplete information games ⋮ Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information ⋮ Correlated Equilibria and Communication in Games ⋮ Incentives and the structure of communication ⋮ Long persuasion games ⋮ Unmediated communication with partially verifiable types ⋮ A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions ⋮ Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games ⋮ Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol ⋮ Mediation, arbitration and negotiation ⋮ Cryptography and Game Theory: Designing Protocols for Exchanging Information ⋮ Cheap talk in games with incomplete information. ⋮ Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
- Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
- A battle-of-the-sexes game with incomplete information
- Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
- Correlation without mediation: Expanding the set of equilibrium outcomes by ``cheap pre-play procedures
- One-shot public mediated talk
- Cheap talk in games with incomplete information.
- Mediated talk
- Perfect correlated equilibria
- Universal Mechanisms
- Multistage Games with Communication
- An Approach to Communication Equilibria
- Sequential Equilibria
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Fair Distribution Protocols or How the Players Replace Fortune
- Cheap Talk and Sequential Equilibria in Signaling Games
- Long Cheap Talk
- Computational Complexity and Communication: Coordination in Two-Player Games
This page was built for publication: Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information.
