Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals
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Publication:6059547
DOI10.3982/te4643OpenAlexW3114153407MaRDI QIDQ6059547
Publication date: 2 November 2023
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te4643
Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)
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