Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages
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Publication:4339085
DOI10.2307/2171817zbMATH Open0871.90110OpenAlexW2089449012MaRDI QIDQ4339085FDOQ4339085
Authors: Daniel J. Seidmann, Eyal Winter 
Publication date: 5 October 1997
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2171817
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Cited In (48)
- Signaling games
- Lobbying with two audiences: Public vs private certification
- Evidence reading mechanisms
- The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: theory and experimental evidence
- Strategic information transmission networks
- Strategic transmission of imperfect information: why revealing evidence (without proof) is difficult
- Cheap talk with coarse understanding
- Manipulated news model: electoral competition and mass media
- Communication with partially verifiable information: an experiment
- Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion
- Long persuasion games
- How to consult an expert? Opinion versus evidence
- Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games
- Communication with evidence in the lab
- Receiver's dilemma
- Persuasion with communication costs
- Strategic Transmission of Costly Information
- Information-theoretic broadcast with dishonest majority for long messages
- Lies and consequences. The effect of lie detection on communication outcomes
- False modesty: when disclosing good news looks bad
- A characterization of equilibrium set of persuasion games with binary actions
- Information transmission in voluntary disclosure games
- Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence
- To invite or not to invite a lobby, that is the question
- Strategic information transmission with sender's approval
- Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals
- Implementation with partial provability
- Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender
- Strategic communication with minimal verification
- On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals
- Evidence disclosure and verifiability
- Strategic information transmission despite conflict
- Hard evidence and mechanism design
- Full revelation under optional verification
- A note on the strategic transmission of endogenous information
- Full disclosure in decentralized organizations
- Strategic information transmission with sender's approval: the single-crossing case
- Disagreement and evidence production in strategic information transmission
- Who benefits from a sender's credibility concern, the sender or a receiver?
- MULTISTAGE COMMUNICATION WITH AND WITHOUT VERIFIABLE TYPES
- On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games
- Experimental design to persuade
- Information transmission when the sender's preferences are uncertain.
- Homotopies on preferences under asymmetric information
- Consulting an expert with potentially conflicting preferences
- Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
- When does centralization undermine adaptation?
- Coordination and private information revelation
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