Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender
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Publication:503060
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2016.11.003zbMath1400.91106OpenAlexW2549701036MaRDI QIDQ503060
Publication date: 11 January 2017
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.11.003
Related Items
Persuasion under ambiguity, Dynamic information design: a simple problem on optimal sequential information disclosure, Testing, disclosure and approval, Persuasion with unknown beliefs, On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals, Constrained persuasion with private information, On the value of persuasion by experts, Centralized policymaking and informational lobbying, Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues. Introduction to the special issue on communication and persuasion, Resisting persuasion, Persuasion with costly precision
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