Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender
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Cites work
- A dynamic model of equilibrium selection in signaling markets
- A Mathematical Theory of Communication
- A note on comparative statics and stochastic dominance
- Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
- Belief-based refinements in signalling games
- Certifiable pre-play communication: full disclosure
- Competition in persuasion
- D1 signaling equilibria with multiple signals and a continuum of types
- Dynamic psychological games
- Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
- Experimental design to persuade
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3068103 (Why is no real title available?)
- Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types
- Informational control and organizational design
- Linear and nonlinear programming
- Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
- Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
- Misinformation
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Persuasion with costly precision
- Psychological games and sequential rationality
- Sequential decisions with tests
- Signal orderings based on dispersion and the supply of private information in auctions
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- Some Stronger Measures of Risk Aversion in the Small and the Large with Applications
- Strategic communication with lying costs
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages
- Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
- Strategic Transmission of Costly Information
- The optimal choice of pre-launch reviewer
Cited in
(50)- Coordination and private information revelation
- On the value of persuasion by experts
- A model of Bayesian persuasion with transfers
- On Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders
- Bayesian persuasion with cheap talk
- Centralized policymaking and informational lobbying
- Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
- Bayesian persuasion with costly messages
- Bayesian persuasion with optimal learning
- Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues. Introduction to the special issue on communication and persuasion
- Resisting persuasion
- Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment
- Persuasion with costly precision
- Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver
- Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms
- Cheap talk with private signal structures
- Impact of private observation in the Bayesian persuasion game
- Bayesian persuasion in unlinked games
- Dynamic information design: a simple problem on optimal sequential information disclosure
- Bayesian persuasion in sequential trials
- Testing, disclosure and approval
- Limiting sender's information in Bayesian persuasion
- Private Bayesian persuasion
- A characterization of equilibrium set of persuasion games with binary actions
- Noisy persuasion
- Monotone persuasion
- Constrained persuasion with private information
- Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
- Persuasion of a privately informed receiver
- Bayesian markets to elicit private information
- Bayesian comparative statics
- Sequential persuasion
- Reminder game: indirectness in persuasion
- BAYESIAN PERSUASION WITH PRIVATE EXPERIMENTATION
- Censorship as optimal persuasion
- Persuasion with unknown beliefs
- On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals
- Sequential Bayesian persuasion
- Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition
- Incentive compatibility in sender-receiver stopping games
- Preparing for the worst but hoping for the best: robust (Bayesian) persuasion
- Belief inducibility and informativeness
- Persuasion with ambiguous receiver preferences
- Mechanism design for acquisition of/stochastic evidence
- Existence of equilibria in persuasion games with costly information acquisition
- Signaling through Bayesian persuasion
- Informal communication
- Bureaucratic norms and dynamic Bayesian persuasion
- Persuasion under ambiguity
- Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion
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