Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender
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Publication:503060
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.11.003zbMATH Open1400.91106OpenAlexW2549701036MaRDI QIDQ503060FDOQ503060
Authors: Jonas Hedlund 
Publication date: 11 January 2017
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.11.003
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Cited In (45)
- Bayesian comparative statics
- Bayesian persuasion in unlinked games
- Centralized policymaking and informational lobbying
- Impact of private observation in the Bayesian persuasion game
- Sequential Bayesian persuasion
- Persuasion under ambiguity
- Persuasion with costly precision
- Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion
- Persuasion with ambiguous receiver preferences
- On the value of persuasion by experts
- Informal communication
- Censorship as optimal persuasion
- A characterization of equilibrium set of persuasion games with binary actions
- Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
- Sequential persuasion
- BAYESIAN PERSUASION WITH PRIVATE EXPERIMENTATION
- Dynamic information design: a simple problem on optimal sequential information disclosure
- Incentive compatibility in sender-receiver stopping games
- On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals
- Persuasion with unknown beliefs
- Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition
- Bayesian persuasion with cheap talk
- Constrained persuasion with private information
- Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver
- Persuasion of a privately informed receiver
- On Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders
- Limiting sender's information in Bayesian persuasion
- Bayesian persuasion with costly messages
- Bayesian persuasion with optimal learning
- Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment
- Bayesian persuasion in sequential trials
- Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues. Introduction to the special issue on communication and persuasion
- Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms
- Resisting persuasion
- Bayesian markets to elicit private information
- Testing, disclosure and approval
- Cheap talk with private signal structures
- Preparing for the worst but hoping for the best: robust (Bayesian) persuasion
- Belief inducibility and informativeness
- A model of Bayesian persuasion with transfers
- Reminder game: indirectness in persuasion
- Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
- Monotone persuasion
- Noisy persuasion
- Coordination and private information revelation
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