Dynamic psychological games

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2008.01.004zbMath1155.91323OpenAlexW3123842769MaRDI QIDQ1001812

Martin Dufwenberg, Pierpaolo Battigalli

Publication date: 19 February 2009

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:igi:igierp:287

zbMATH Keywords

psychological games belief-dependent motivation dynamic interactive epistemology extensive-form solution concepts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60) Decision theory for games (91A35)

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