A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences*
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3401193
DOI10.1162/qjec.121.4.1133zbMath1179.91059MaRDI QIDQ3401193
Publication date: 29 January 2010
Published in: Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/0w82b6nm
91B08: Individual preferences
Related Items
Financial market equilibria with heterogeneous agents: CAPM and market segmentation, Variable preference relations: existence of maximal elements, Risk-neutral firms can extract unbounded profits from consumers with prospect theory preferences, Money matters: an axiomatic theory of the endowment effect, Choice and individual welfare, The Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution with loss aversion, Limited liability and the risk-incentive relationship, The willingness-to-accept/willingness-to-pay disparity in repeated markets: loss aversion or ``bad-deal aversion?, Extreme events and entropy: a multiple quantile utility model, Reference-dependent expected utility with incomplete preferences, Endowment effects? ``Even with half a million on the table!, Third-generation prospect theory, Context effects: a representation of choices from categories, Fairness and desert in tournaments, Utility from anticipation and personal equilibrium, Dynamic psychological games, Market simulation and the provision of public goods: a non-paternalistic response to anomalies in environmental evaluation, Auctions with a buy price: the case of reference-dependent preferences, Taste uncertainty and status quo effects in consumer choice, Monopoly pricing when consumers are antagonized by unexpected price increases: a ``cover version of the Heidhues-Kőszegi-Rabin model, Fear of losing in a clock auction, Maximal elements under reference-dependent preferences with applications to behavioral traps and games, A folk theorem for endogenous reference points, Anticipated regret as an explanation of uncertainty aversion, Multi-dimensional reference-dependent preferences in sealed-bid auctions -- how (most) laboratory experiments differ from the field, A theory of reference-dependent behavior, A preference foundation for constant loss aversion, Bargaining with history-dependent preferences, Risk aversion and expected-utility theory: a calibration exercise, Self-regulation through Goal Setting*
