Bankruptcy problems with reference-dependent preferences
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Publication:2424247
DOI10.1007/s00182-018-0647-5zbMath1411.91333OpenAlexW2515864740WikidataQ128977915 ScholiaQ128977915MaRDI QIDQ2424247
Publication date: 24 June 2019
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.bemservizi.unito.it/repec/tur/wpapnw/m38.pdf
Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Welfare economics (91B15)
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Cites Work
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