The rights egalitarian solution for NTU sharing problems
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Publication:532717
DOI10.1007/S00182-009-0177-2zbMath1211.91036OpenAlexW2032835604MaRDI QIDQ532717
Antonio Villar, Carmen Herrero
Publication date: 5 May 2011
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.upo.es/serv/bib/wps/econ0901.pdf
Related Items (5)
Bankruptcy problems with reference-dependent preferences ⋮ The tempered aspirations solution for bargaining problems with a reference point ⋮ Extending the Nash solution to choice problems with reference points ⋮ Bargaining with independence of higher or irrelevant claims ⋮ Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update
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