The rights egalitarian solution for NTU sharing problems

DOI10.1007/S00182-009-0177-2MaRDI QIDQ532717zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Carmen Herrero, Antonio Villar

Publication date 5 May 2011

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.upo.es/serv/bib/wps/econ0901.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

NTU problemsrights egalitarian solutionsharing problems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cites work

• A comparison of non-transferable utility values
• A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game
• An Axiomatization of Harsanyi's Nontransferable Utility Solution
• An axiomatization of the consistent non-transferable utility value
• Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey.
• Bargaining and Value
• Bargaining problems with claims
• Endogenous reference points and the adjusted proportional solution for bargaining problems with claims
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 44383 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 592680 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 910813 (Why is no real title available?)
• Individual rights and collective responsibility: The rights-egalitarian solution
• On Dividing an Amount According to Individual Claims or Liabilities
• Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
• Potential, Value, and Consistency
• The bargaining problem
• The compromise value for NTU-games
• The consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games
• The Nash rationing problem

Cited in

(9)

• The proportional solution for rights problems
• A noncooperative justification for egalitarian surplus sharing
• Individual rights and collective responsibility: The rights-egalitarian solution
• Bargaining with independence of higher or irrelevant claims
• Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update
• Bankruptcy problems with reference-dependent preferences
• Extending the Nash solution to choice problems with reference points
• The Nash rationing problem
• The tempered aspirations solution for bargaining problems with a reference point

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