The Bargaining Problem
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Publication:3065758
DOI10.2307/1907266zbMath1202.91122WikidataQ55880204 ScholiaQ55880204MaRDI QIDQ3065758
Publication date: 6 January 2011
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1907266
91A05: 2-person games
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91A30: Utility theory for games
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