A \(\beta\)-core existence result and its application to oligopoly markets
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Publication:1294109
DOI10.1006/game.1998.0654zbMath0926.91031MaRDI QIDQ1294109
Publication date: 11 November 1999
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0654
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Cites Work
- A local theory of cooperative games
- A generalization of Scarf's theorem: An \(\alpha\)-core existence theorem without transitivity or completeness
- The hybrid solutions of an \(n\)-person game
- A cooperative analysis of covert collusion in oligopolistic industries
- The hybrid equilibria and core selection in exchange economies with externalities
- The Bargaining Problem
- Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
- The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
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