Nash bargaining in ordinal environments

DOI10.1007/s10058-012-0134-6zbMath1282.91130OpenAlexW2146967409MaRDI QIDQ1929137

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Publication date: 7 January 2013

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-012-0134-6

zbMATH Keywords

independence of irrelevant alternativesbargainingbraceordinal invarianceShapley-Shubik rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

A non-cooperative approach to the ordinal Shapley-Shubik rule ⋮ On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results ⋮ Ordinal invariance in multicoalitional bargaining.

Cites Work

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• Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
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