A non-cooperative approach to the ordinal Shapley-Shubik rule
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Publication:898669
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2015.07.008zbMATH Open1368.91017OpenAlexW2135120041MaRDI QIDQ898669FDOQ898669
Authors: Juan J. Vidal-Puga 
Publication date: 18 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.07.008
Recommendations
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10)
Cites Work
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- Nash bargaining in ordinal environments
Cited In (6)
- A non-cooperative mechanism for the Shapley value of airport problems
- Egalitarianism in ordinal bargaining: the Shapley-Shubik rule
- An ordinal Shapley value for economic environments
- An ordinal solution to bargaining problems with many players.
- Ordinal invariance in multicoalitional bargaining.
- Nash bargaining in ordinal environments
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