A non-cooperative approach to the ordinal Shapley-Shubik rule

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2015.07.008MaRDI QIDQ898669zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Juan J. Vidal-Puga

Publication date 18 December 2015

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.07.008

zbMATH Keywords

ordinal bargainingordinal Shapley-Shubik rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5547963 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1194806 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3347963 (Why is no real title available?)
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• An ordinal Shapley value for economic environments
• An ordinal solution to bargaining problems with many players.
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• Bargaining and Value
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• Bargaining with ordinal and cardinal players
• Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
• Core implementation and increasing returns to scale for cooperation
• Egalitarianism in ordinal bargaining: the Shapley-Shubik rule
• Implementation of allocation rules under perfect information
• Multilateral bargaining problems
• Nash bargaining in ordinal environments
• Non-cooperative implementation of the nucleolus: The 3-player case
• Odd man out: The proposal-making model
• Ordinal invariance in multicoalitional bargaining.
• Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
• Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
• Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Subscription mechanisms for network formation.
• The bargaining problem
• Trust in triads: Effects of exit, control, and learning.
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

Cited in

(6)

• An ordinal Shapley value for economic environments
• Nash bargaining in ordinal environments
• A non-cooperative mechanism for the Shapley value of airport problems
• An ordinal solution to bargaining problems with many players.
• Ordinal invariance in multicoalitional bargaining.
• Egalitarianism in ordinal bargaining: the Shapley-Shubik rule

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