Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
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Publication:5958894
DOI10.1006/jeth.2000.2704zbMath0992.91010MaRDI QIDQ5958894
David Pérez-Castrillo, David Wettstein
Publication date: 20 March 2002
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ddd.uab.cat/record/45235
91A12: Cooperative games
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