Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2452118
Recommendations
- The Egalitarian Shapley value: a generalization based on coalition sizes
- Monotonic Solutions to General Cooperative Games
- A coalitional compromised solution for cooperative games
- Marginalism, egalitarianism and efficiency in multi-choice games
- A-potential function and a non-cooperative foundation for the solidarity value
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3138565 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Concept of Egalitarianism Under Participation Constraints
- A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case
- A Survey of Consistency Properties in Cooperative Game Theory
- A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems
- An axiomatization of the Shapley value using a fairness property
- Axiomatizations of a class of equal surplus sharing solutions for TU-games
- Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value
- Bargaining and Value
- Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
- Coincidence of and collinearity between game theoretic solutions
- Conference structures and fair allocation rules
- Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach
- Limited Rights as Partial Veto and Sen’s Impossibility Theorem
- Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
- NULL PLAYERS OUT? LINEAR VALUES FOR GAMES WITH VARIABLE SUPPORTS
- Note on linear consistency of anonymous values for TU-games
- Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
- Potential, Value, and Consistency
- Sequencing games
- Sharing a polluted river
- Sharing a river.
- The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games
- The consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games
- Value Theory Without Efficiency
- ``Procedural values for cooperative games
Cited in
(67)- Rationality, aggregate monotonicity and consistency in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results
- A strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule for digraph cooperative games
- A new axiomatization of a class of equal surplus division values for TU games
- On the axiomatic approach to sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues
- Axiomatization and implementation of a class of solidarity values for TU-games
- Weakly monotonic solutions for cooperative games
- Weakly differentially monotonic solutions for cooperative games
- Axiomatic characterizations of the egalitarian solidarity values
- Monotonicity in sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues
- The family of ideal values for cooperative games
- Valuation monotonicity, fairness and stability in assignment problems
- Generalizations of Sobolev's consistency and values for TU-games
- Effects of players' nullification and equal (surplus) division values
- Redistribution to the less productive: parallel characterizations of the egalitarian Shapley and consensus values
- The weighted-egalitarian Shapley values
- Procedural interpretation and associated consistency for the Egalitarian Shapley values
- New characterizations of the discounted Shapley values
- Modeling values for TU-games using generalized versions of consistency, standardness and the null player property
- ``Procedural values for cooperative games
- A strategic approach for the discounted Shapley values
- Marginalism, egalitarianism and efficiency in multi-choice games
- Group contributions in TU-games: a class of \(k\)-lateral Shapley values
- Reassignment-proof rules for land rental problems
- A coalitional compromised solution for cooperative games
- A note on the Sobolev consistency of linear symmetric values
- The balanced contributions property for equal contributors
- Recursive and bargaining values
- A note on associated consistency and linear, symmetric values
- The burning coalition bargaining model
- A strategic implementation of the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games
- Process and optimization implementation of the \(\alpha \)-ENSC value
- Implementation and axiomatization of discounted Shapley values
- Consistency, population solidarity, and egalitarian solutions for TU-games
- A decomposition of the space of TU-games using addition and transfer invariance
- Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
- The Egalitarian Shapley value: a generalization based on coalition sizes
- Coalitional surplus desirability and the equal surplus division value
- Pyramidal values
- A-potential function and a non-cooperative foundation for the solidarity value
- On an extension of the concept of TU-games and their values
- Allocating extra revenues from broadcasting sports leagues
- The central core and the mid-central core as novel set-valued and point-valued solution concepts for transferable utility coalitional games
- Relationally equal treatment of equals and affine combinations of values for TU games
- Parallel axiomatizations of weighted and multiweighted Shapley values, random order values, and the Harsanyi set
- Weak differential marginality and the Shapley value
- Hart--Mas-Colell implementation of the discounted Shapley value
- The allocation of marginal surplus for cooperative games with transferable utility
- Core stability of the Shapley value for cooperative games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3894787 (Why is no real title available?)
- Axiomatizations and a Noncooperative Interpretation of the α-CIS Value
- Monotonicity implies linearity: characterizations of convex combinations of solutions to cooperative games
- Cohesive efficiency in TU-games: axiomatizations of variants of the Shapley value, egalitarian values and their convex combinations
- Coalitional desirability and the equal division value
- Lexicographic solutions for coalitional rankings based on individual and collective performances
- Equal support from others for unproductive players: efficient and linear values that satisfy the equal treatment and weak null player out properties for cooperative games
- The in-group egalitarian Owen values
- Axiomatizations of convex compromise rules for redistribution of non-negative income
- Coalition-weighted Shapley values
- Differential marginality, inessential games and convex combinations of values
- Players' dummification and the dummified egalitarian non-separable contribution value
- Anonymity in sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues
- A new value for cooperative games based on coalition size
- Analysis of the core under inequality-averse utility functions
- On a new method of analyzing properties of efficient, symmetric and linear values of TU-games
- The \(\alpha \)-egalitarian Myerson value of games with communication structure
- Equal surplus sharing values for games with coalition structures
- Some advances in cooperative game theory: indivisibilities, externalities and axiomatic approach
This page was built for publication: Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2452118)
