Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values

DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0634-2zbMATH Open1288.91019OpenAlexW2158691675MaRDI QIDQ2452118FDOQ2452118

Authors: Yukihiko Funaki, Yuan Ju, René van den Brink 

Publication date: 30 May 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0634-2

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

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Cited In (67)

• A coalitional compromised solution for cooperative games
• Marginalism, egalitarianism and efficiency in multi-choice games
• Cohesive efficiency in TU-games: axiomatizations of variants of the Shapley value, egalitarian values and their convex combinations
• The family of ideal values for cooperative games
• Effects of players' nullification and equal (surplus) division values
• Consistency, population solidarity, and egalitarian solutions for TU-games
• Modeling values for TU-games using generalized versions of consistency, standardness and the null player property
• A note on associated consistency and linear, symmetric values
• Core stability of the Shapley value for cooperative games
• On the axiomatic approach to sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues
• A strategic implementation of the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games
• Coalitional surplus desirability and the equal surplus division value
• Allocating extra revenues from broadcasting sports leagues
• Monotonicity in sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues
• Implementation and axiomatization of discounted Shapley values
• The central core and the mid-central core as novel set-valued and point-valued solution concepts for transferable utility coalitional games
• A new axiomatization of a class of equal surplus division values for TU games
• Redistribution to the less productive: parallel characterizations of the egalitarian Shapley and consensus values
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A note on the Sobolev consistency of linear symmetric values
• Axiomatic characterizations of the egalitarian solidarity values
• The balanced contributions property for equal contributors
• Coalitional desirability and the equal division value
• Recursive and bargaining values
• On an extension of the concept of TU-games and their values
• Parallel axiomatizations of weighted and multiweighted Shapley values, random order values, and the Harsanyi set
• The allocation of marginal surplus for cooperative games with transferable utility
• Valuation monotonicity, fairness and stability in assignment problems
• Generalizations of Sobolev's consistency and values for TU-games
• Relationally equal treatment of equals and affine combinations of values for TU games
• Weakly monotonic solutions for cooperative games
• ``Procedural values for cooperative games
• Hart--Mas-Colell implementation of the discounted Shapley value
• A decomposition of the space of TU-games using addition and transfer invariance
• Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
• The Egalitarian Shapley value: a generalization based on coalition sizes
• A strategic approach for the discounted Shapley values
• Process and optimization implementation of the \(\alpha \)-ENSC value
• Axiomatizations and a Noncooperative Interpretation of the α-CIS Value
• Rationality, aggregate monotonicity and consistency in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results
• The weighted-egalitarian Shapley values
• Reassignment-proof rules for land rental problems
• Pyramidal values
• New characterizations of the discounted Shapley values
• Weak differential marginality and the Shapley value
• Monotonicity implies linearity: characterizations of convex combinations of solutions to cooperative games
• Procedural interpretation and associated consistency for the Egalitarian Shapley values
• Group contributions in TU-games: a class of \(k\)-lateral Shapley values
• A strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule for digraph cooperative games
• Axiomatization and implementation of a class of solidarity values for TU-games
• A-potential function and a non-cooperative foundation for the solidarity value
• Lexicographic solutions for coalitional rankings based on individual and collective performances
• Weakly differentially monotonic solutions for cooperative games
• The burning coalition bargaining model
• Anonymity in sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues
• Analysis of the core under inequality-averse utility functions
• The in-group egalitarian Owen values
• Coalition-weighted Shapley values
• Equal support from others for unproductive players: efficient and linear values that satisfy the equal treatment and weak null player out properties for cooperative games
• Players' dummification and the dummified egalitarian non-separable contribution value
• Equal surplus sharing values for games with coalition structures
• A new value for cooperative games based on coalition size
• On a new method of analyzing properties of efficient, symmetric and linear values of TU-games
• Some advances in cooperative game theory: indivisibilities, externalities and axiomatic approach
• Axiomatizations of convex compromise rules for redistribution of non-negative income
• Differential marginality, inessential games and convex combinations of values
• The \(\alpha \)-egalitarian Myerson value of games with communication structure

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