Reassignment-proof rules for land rental problems

DOI10.1007/S00182-019-00684-2MaRDI QIDQ2178644zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Alfredo Valencia-Toledo, Juan J. Vidal-Puga

Publication date 11 May 2020

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/11093/1563

zbMATH Keywords

consistencynon-manipulabilityland monotonicityland rentalreassignment-proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cited in

(1)

• A sequential bargaining protocol for land rental arrangements

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