Manipulation via merging and splitting in claims problems

DOI10.1007/s10058-003-0097-8zbMath1084.91024OpenAlexW1988974577MaRDI QIDQ1414889

Biung-Ghi Ju

Publication date: 2003

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-003-0097-8

zbMATH Keywords

subadditivesuperadditivenon-manipulable via mergingnon-manipulable via splitting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (17)

BANKRUPTCY RULES AND COALITIONAL MANIPULATION ⋮ A sequential partition method for non-cooperative games of bankruptcy problems ⋮ Non-manipulable division rules in claim problems and generalizations ⋮ Reassignment-proof rules for land rental problems ⋮ Inequality preserving rationing ⋮ ERRATUM: "BANKRUPTCY RULES AND COALITIONAL MANIPULATION" ⋮ Remarks on solidarity in bankruptcy problems when agents merge or split ⋮ Non-manipulability by clones in bankruptcy problems ⋮ Merging and splitting in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results ⋮ Proportional clearing mechanisms in financial systems: an axiomatic approach ⋮ A note on coalitional manipulation and centralized inventory management ⋮ Proportional scheduling, split-proofness, and merge-proofness ⋮ New variable-population paradoxes for resource allocation ⋮ Progressive and merging-proof taxation ⋮ PROPORTIONALITY AND NON-MANIPULABILITY IN BANKRUPTCY PROBLEMS ⋮ Some game theoretic marketing attribution models ⋮ Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update

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