Proportional scheduling, split-proofness, and merge-proofness
From MaRDI portal
Publication:932808
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.09.002zbMath1142.90407OpenAlexW2084800967MaRDI QIDQ932808
Publication date: 11 July 2008
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.09.002
Related Items (10)
Reassignment-proof rules for land rental problems ⋮ Second-best mechanisms in queuing problems without transfers: the role of random priorities ⋮ Compensation and sacrifice in the probabilistic rationing of indivisible units ⋮ Weak group strategy-proof and queue-efficient mechanisms for the queueing problem with multiple machines ⋮ Some characterizations of generalized top trading cycles ⋮ Sharing cost of network among users with differentiated willingness to pay ⋮ Optimal shill bidding in the VCG mechanism ⋮ New variable-population paradoxes for resource allocation ⋮ Knapsack cost sharing ⋮ Progressive and merging-proof taxation
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs
- Non-manipulable division rules in claim problems and generalizations
- Equal or proportional division of a surplus, and other methods
- Induced binary probabilities and the linear ordering polytope: A status report
- Filling a multicolor urn: An axiomatic analysis.
- Manipulation via merging and splitting in claims problems
- Structure of a simple scheduling polyhedron
- A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems
- Achieving the first best in sequencing problems.
- Agreement, separability, and other axioms for quasi-linear social choice problems
- A pessimistic approach to the queueing problem
- Cores of convex games
- The proportional random allocation of indivisible units
- On demand responsiveness in additive cost sharing
- Priority Auctions and Queue Disciplines That Depend on Processing Time
- Egalitarianism and Utilitarianism in Quasi-Linear Bargaining
- On Scheduling Fees to Prevent Merging, Splitting, and Transferring of Jobs
- On the Discrete Version of the Aumann-Shapley Cost-Sharing Method
- Fair Queuing and Other Probabilistic Allocation Methods
- Mechanism design in queueing problems
This page was built for publication: Proportional scheduling, split-proofness, and merge-proofness
