A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(02)00036-4MaRDI QIDQ1810697zbMATHFDO

Authors François Maniquet

Publication date 9 June 2003

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valueequal responsibilityImpatience independenceQueueing problems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3138565 (Why is no real title available?)
• An Application of the Shapley Value to Fair Division with Money
• Equality of Resources Implies Equality of Welfare
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• On weighted Shapley values
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• Refinements of the no-envy solution in economies with indivisible goods
• The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population
• The Pure Compensation Problem: Egalitarianism Versus Laissez-Fairism
• The fair allocation of an indivisible good when monetary compensations are possible
• Trade-off between equity and efficiency in a general economy with indivisible goods
• Welfare bounds in the fair division problem
• Welfare-domination under preference-replacement: a survey and open questions

Cited in

(73)

• Comparable characterizations of four solutions for permission tree games
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• Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification
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• Computer science and decision theory
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• Comments on: ``Recent developments in the queueing problem
• The on-line transfer rule for queueing with arrivals
• Allocating positions fairly: auctions and Shapley value
• Recent developments in the queueing problem
• Balanced externalities and the proportional allocation of nonseparable contributions
• Balanced VCG mechanisms for sequencing problems
• Axiomatic characterizations of the core without consistency
• The Shapley value in positional queueing problems

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