Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3362076
DOI10.2307/2938172zbMath0734.90026OpenAlexW1993562044MaRDI QIDQ3362076
David Gale, Gabrielle Demange, Ahmet U. Alkan
Publication date: 1991
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/e0aceb3cdd4c32acd1fadbbda973ecc5e7c65537
constrained optimizationindivisible goodsfair allocationscriteria of justiceefficient, envy free allocations
Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Related Items
On fair compensation, Coalition formation in games of fair division, Sharing an increase of the rent fairly, No-envy and egalitarian-equivalence under multi-object-demand for heterogeneous objects, Incentive-compatible simple mechanisms, The fair allocation of an indivisible good when monetary compensations are possible, Solving house allocation problems with risk-averse agents, A characterization of egalitarian equivalence, Monotonicity and envyfree assignments, Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: a market design approach, Joint misrepresentation with bribes, Computing envy-freeable allocations with limited subsidies, David in Paris, ReGale: some memorable results, Distributed fair allocation of indivisible goods, Refinements of the no-envy solution in economies with indivisible goods, Generalized Rental Harmony, Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities, Sequential resource allocation with constraints: two-customer case, A polynomial algorithm for maxmin and minmax envy-free rent division on a soft budget, A general strategy proof fair allocation mechanism, Divide and compromise, Two birds with one stone: fairness and welfare via transfers, Maskin monotonicity in economies with indivisible goods and money, Egalitarianism in the queueing problem, Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money, Equity and the Vickrey allocation rule on general preference domains, An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy‐free and budget‐balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities, Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market, Rental harmony with roommates, Sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions, Fair division of goods in the shadow of market values, Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money, Fairness over time in dynamic resource allocation with an application in healthcare, Consistent queueing rules, Equal shadow wealth: a new concept of fairness in exchange economies, Equitable rent division on a soft budget, Are incentives against economic justice?, Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity, The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods, Fair division under joint ownership: Recent results and open problems, Assigning papers to referees, Evolution of cooperation in rotating indivisible goods game, Cooperative production: A comparison of lower and upper bounds, Weakly fair allocations and strategy-proofness, Sets in excess demand in simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders, Market allocation of indivisible goods, Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities, Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation, Fairness and implementability in allocation of indivisible objects with monetary compensations, Allocating positions fairly: auctions and Shapley value, The problem of multiple commons: a market design approach, Fair division of mixed divisible and indivisible goods, Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations, Strategic divide and choose, Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: characterization of minimum price rule, Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem, Social orderings for the assignment of indivisible objects, The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation, Manipulation games in economies with indivisible goods, The roles of particle swarm intelligence in the prisoner's dilemma based on continuous and mixed strategy systems on scale-free networks, Gabrielle Demange, Fair division of indivisible items among people with similar preferences, Constrainedly fair job assignments under minimum wages, Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms, No-envy in queueing problems, Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods, House allocation with transfers, Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint, Non-manipulable assignment of individuals to positions revisited, Nash-implementation of the no-envy solution on symmetric domains of economies, A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems, Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness, On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals, Competitive Equilibrium with Indivisible Goods and Generic Budgets, Fair Groves mechanisms, ``Fair marriages: an impossibility, Welfarism and rationalizability in allocation problems with indivisibilities, Balancedness of permutation games and envy-free allocations in indivisible good economies, Fully Polynomial-Time Approximation Schemes for Fair Rent Division, Strategy-proof assignment with fair compensation, Pareto principles from Inch to Ell, No-envy in the Queueing Problem with Multiple Identical Machines, An equilibrium analysis of Knaster's fair division procedure, Sequential Resource Allocation for Nonprofit Operations, Envy-free and Pareto efficient allocations in economies with indivisible goods and money
