Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations
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Publication:946368
DOI10.1007/s00199-007-0311-yzbMath1176.91062OpenAlexW2050349682MaRDI QIDQ946368
Publication date: 23 September 2008
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0311-y
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