Strategy-proofness versus symmetry in economies with an indivisible good and money
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Publication:2259421
DOI10.1007/s00182-014-0425-yzbMath1319.91101OpenAlexW2039364027MaRDI QIDQ2259421
Shinji Ohseto, Shohei Tamura, Miki Kato
Publication date: 4 March 2015
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0425-y
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Related Items (3)
An introduction to mechanized reasoning ⋮ Strategy-proof and Pareto efficient allocation of indivisible goods: general impossibility domains ⋮ Collusion-proof and fair auctions
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