Fair imposition
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1886294
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2003.11.005zbMath1099.91053MaRDI QIDQ1886294
Moshe Tennenholtz, Yoav Shoham, Ryan Porter
Publication date: 18 November 2004
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2003.11.005
91A80: Applications of game theory
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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